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Abstract
The method of Maximum (relative) Entropy (ME) is used to translate
the information contained in the known form of the likelihood into a prior
distribution for Bayesian inference. The argument is guided by intuition
gained from the successful use of ME methods in statistical mechanics.
For experiments that cannot be repeated the resulting “entropic prior” is
formally identical with the Einstein fluctuation formula. For repeatable
experiments, however, the expected value of the entropy of the likelihood
turns out to be relevant information that must be included in the analysis.
As an example the entropic prior for a Gaussian likelihood is calculated.
1 Introduction
Among the methods used to update from a prior probability distribution to a
posterior distribution when new information becomes available there are two
that can claim the distinction of being systematic, objective, and of wide ap-
plicability: one is based on Bayes’ theorem (for applications to physics see [1])
and the other is based on the maximization of (relative) entropy [2]. The choice
between the two methods is dictated by the nature of the information being
processed.
Bayes’ theorem should be used when we want to update our beliefs about
the values of quantities θ on the basis of observed values of data y and of the
known relation between them – the likelihood p(y|θ). The posterior distribution
is p(θ|y) ∝ π(θ)p(y|θ). The previous knowledge about θ is codified both in the
prior distribution π(θ) and also in the likelihood p(y|θ).
The selection of the prior is a difficult problem [3] because it is not always
clear how to translate our previous beliefs about θ into a distribution π(θ) in an
objective way. One approach that seems to work, at least sometimes, is to rely
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on experience and physical intuition but this becomes unreliable in situations
of increasing complexity. Attempts to achieve objectivity include arguments
invoking symmetry – generalized forms of the principle of insufficient reason
– and arguments that seek to identify that state of knowledge that reflects
complete ignorance. The latter suggest connections with the notion of entropy
[4] and have led to proposals for “entropic priors” [5, 6]. This brings us to
the second method of processing information, the method of maximum entropy,
which is designed for processing information given in the form of constraints on
the family of posterior distributions [2].
In this paper we use entropic arguments to translate information into a
prior distribution [7]. Rather than seeking a totally non-informative prior, we
translate information that we do in fact have: the knowledge of the likelihood
function, p(y|θ), already constitutes valuable prior information. The prior thus
obtained is an “entropic prior.” The bare entropic priors discussed here apply
to a situation where all we know about the quantities θ is that they appear as
parameters in the likelihood p(y|θ). It is straightforward, however, to extend the
method and incorporate additional relevant information beyond that contained
in the likelihood.
The first proposal of priors of this form is due to Skilling [5] for the case of
discrete distributions. The second proposal, due to Rodr´ıguez [6], provided the
generalization to the continuous case and further elaborations [8, 9]. In section
2 we give a derivation that is closer in spirit to applications of ME to statistical
mechanics. A difficulty with the case of experiments that can be indefinitely
repeated, which had been identified in [10], is diagnosed and resolved with the
introduction of a hyper-parameter α in section 3. The analogy to statistical
mechanics is important: the interpretation of α as a Lagrange multiplier affects
how α should be estimated and is an important difference between the entropic
prior proposed here and those of Skilling and Rodr´ıguez. The example of a
Gaussian likelihood is given in section 4. In section 5 we collect our conclusions
and some final comments.
2 The basic idea
We use the ME method [2] to derive a prior π(θ) for use in Bayes’ theorem
p(θ|y) ∝ p(y, θ) = π(θ)p(y|θ). As discussed in [10], since Bayes’ theorem follows
from the product rule we must focus our attention on p(y, θ) rather than π(θ).
Thus, the relevant universe of discourse is the product Θ×Y of Θ, the space of
all θs, and the data space Y . This important point was first made by Rodr´ıguez
[8] but both our derivation and final results differ from his [8, 9].
To rank distributions on the space Θ × Y we must first decide on a prior
m(y, θ). When nothing is known about the variables θ – in particular, no relation
between y and θ is yet known – the prior must be a product m(y)µ(θ) of the
separate priors in the spaces Y and Θ because maximizing the relative entropy
σ[p] = −
∫
dy dθ p(y, θ) log
p(y, θ)
m(y)µ(θ)
, (1)
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yields p(y, θ) ∝ m(y)µ(θ).This distribution reflects our state of ignorance: the
data about y tells us absolutely nothing about θ.
In what follows we assume that m(y) is known because it is an important
part of understanding what data it is that has been collected. Furthermore, if
the θs are parameters labeling some distributions p(y|θ), then for each particular
choice of the functional form of p(y|θ) there is a natural distance in the space
Θ given by the Fisher-Rao metric dℓ2 = gijdθ
idθj , [11]
gij =
∫
dy p(y|θ)
∂ log p(y|θ)
∂θi
∂ log p(y|θ)
∂θj
. (2)
Therefore the prior on θ is µ(θ) = g1/2(θ) where g(θ) is the determinant of gij .
Next we incorporate the crucial piece of information: of all joint distributions
p(y, θ) = π(θ)p(y|θ) we consider the subset where the likelihood p(y|θ) has a
fixed, known functional form. Notice that this is an unusual constraint; it is not
an expectation value. Note also that the only information we are using about the
quantities θ is that they appear as parameters in the known likelihood p(y|θ),
nothing else. But, of course, should additional relevant information (i.e., an
additional constraint) be known it should also be taken into account.
The preferred distribution p(y, θ) is chosen by varying π(θ) to maximize
σ[π] = −
∫
dy dθ π(θ)p(y|θ) log
π(θ)p(y|θ)
g1/2(θ)m(y)
. (3)
Assuming that both π(θ) and p(y|θ) are normalized the result is
π(θ)dθ =
1
ζ
eS(θ)g1/2(θ)dθ where ζ =
∫
dθ g1/2(θ) eS(θ), (4)
and S(θ) is the entropy of the likelihood,
S(θ) = −
∫
dy p(y|θ) log
p(y|θ)
m(y)
. (5)
The entropic prior eq.(4) is our first important result: it gives the probability
that the value of θ should lie within the small volume g1/2(θ)dθ. The preferred
value of θ is that which maximizes the entropy S(θ) because this maximizes the
scalar probability density expS(θ). Note that eq.(4) manifestly invariant under
changes of the coordinates θ.
To summarize: for the special case of a fixed data space Y , that is, for
experiments that cannot be repeated, we have succeeded in translating the in-
formation contained in the model – the space Y , its measure m(y), and the
conditional distribution p(y|θ) – into a prior π(θ).
But for experiments that can be repeated indefinitely the prior (4) yields
nonsense and we have a problem. Indeed, let us assume that θ is not a “random”
variable, its value is fixed but unknown. For N independent repetitions of an
experiment, the joint distribution in the space Θ× Y N is
p(y(N), θ) = π(N)(θ) p(y(N)|θ) = π(N)(θ)p(y1|θ) . . . p(yN |θ), (6)
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and maximization of the appropriate σ(N) entropy gives [10]
π(N)(θ) =
1
Z(N)
g1/2(θ) eNS(θ), (7)
which is clearly wrong. The dependence of π(N) on the amount N of data would
lead us to a perpetual revision of the prior as more data is collected. For large
N the data becomes irrelevant.
The problem, as we will see next, is not a failure of the ME method but a
failure to include all the relevant information. Indeed, when an experiment can
be repeated we actually know more than just p(y(N)|θ) = p(y1|θ) . . . p(yN |θ).
We also know that discarding the values of say y2, . . . yN , yields an experiment
that is indistinguishable from the single, N = 1, experiment. This additional
information, which is expressed by
∫
dy2 . . . dyN p(y
(N), θ) = p(y1, θ) leads to
π(N)(θ) = π(1)(θ) for all N . Next we identify a constraint that codifies this
information within each space Θ× Y N .
3 More information: the Lagrange multiplier α
For large N the prior π(N)(θ) in eq.(7) reflects an overwhelming preference for
the value of θ that maximizes the entropy S(θ). Indeed, as N →∞ we have
〈S〉 =
∫
dθ π(N)(θ)S(θ)
N→∞
−→ S(θmax) , (8)
which is manifestly incorrect. This suggests that information about the actual
numerical value S¯ of the expected entropy 〈S〉 is very relevant (because if S¯
were known the problem above would not arise) and that we should maximize
σ(N) subject to an additional constraint on S¯. Naturally, additional steps will
be needed to estimate the unknown S¯. A similar argument justifying the intro-
duction of constraints in statistical physics is explored in [2].
We maximize the entropy
σ(N)[π] = −
∫
dθ dy(N) π(θ)p(y(N)|θ) log
π(θ)p(y(N)|θ)
g1/2(θ)m(y(N))
(9)
subject to constraints on 〈S〉 and that π be normalized. (An unimportant factor
of Nd/2 has been dropped from the Fisher-Rao measure g(N)(θ).) The result is
π(θ) =
1
ζ
g1/2(θ) exp [(N + λN )S(θ)] . (10)
The undesired dependence on N is eliminated if the Lagrange multipliers λN in
each space Θ × Y N are chosen so that N + λN = α is a constant independent
of N . The resulting entropic prior,
π(θ|α) =
1
ζ(α)
g1/2(θ)eαS(θ) (11)
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is our second important result. The prior π(θ|α) incorporates information con-
tained in the likelihood plus information about
〈S〉 = S¯(α) =
d
dα
log ζ(α) where ζ(α) =
∫
dθ g1/2(θ)eαS(θ) . (12)
The last step would be to estimate α and θ from Bayes’ theorem
p(α, θ|y(N)) = π(α)π(θ|α)
p(y(N) |θ)
p(y(N))
, (13)
where π(α) is a prior for α. However, if we are only interested in θ, we can just
marginalize over α to get
p(θ|y(N)) =
∫
dα p(α, θ|y(N)) = π¯(θ)
p(y(N)|θ)
p(y(N))
(14)
where
π¯(θ) =
∫
dαπ(α)π(θ|α) . (15)
The averaged π¯(θ) is our final expression for the entropic prior. It is independent
of the actual data y(N) as it should.
Next we assign an entropic prior to α. We start by pointing out that α is
not on the same footing and should not be treated like the other parameters
θ because the relation between α and the data y is indirect: α is related to θ
through π(θ|α), and θ is related to y through p(y|θ). Once θ is given, the data
y contains no further information about α. Since the whole significance of α is
derived purely from π(θ|α), eq.(11), the relevant universe of discourse is A×Θ
with α ∈ A and not A×Θ× Y N as in [6] which requires the introduction of an
endless chain of hyper-parameters.
We therefore consider the joint distribution π(α, θ) = π(α)π(θ|α) and obtain
π(α) by maximizing the entropy
Σ[π] = −
∫
dα dθ π(α, θ) log
π(α, θ)
γ1/2(α) g1/2(θ)
(16)
where γ1/2(α) is determined below. Since no reference is made to repeatable
experiments in Y N there is no need for any further constraints – and no further
hyper-parameters – except for normalization. The result is
π(α) =
1
z
γ1/2(α)es(α) , (17)
where using eqs.(11) and (12) the Fisher-Rao measure γ(α) is
γ(α) =
∫
dθ π(θ|α)
[
d
dα
log π(θ|α)
]2
=
d2 log ζ(α)
dα2
, (18)
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and where s(α) is given by
s(α) = −
∫
dθ π(θ|α) log
π(θ|α)
g1/2(θ)
= log ζ(α) − α
d log ζ(α)
dα
. (19)
This completes our derivation of the actual prior for θ: the averaged π¯(θ) in
eq.(15) codifies information contained in the likelihood function, plus the insight
that for repeatable experiments, information about the expected likelihood en-
tropy, even if unavailable, is relevant.
4 Example: a Gaussian model
Consider data y(N) = {y1, . . . , yN} that are scattered around an unknown value
µ,
y = µ+ ν (20)
with 〈ν〉 = 0 and 〈ν2〉 = σ2. The goal is to estimate θ = (µ, σ) on the basis
of y(N) and the information implicit in the data space Y , its measure m(y)
(discussed below), and the Gaussian likelihood,
p(y|µ, σ) =
1
(2πσ2)
1/2
exp
[
−
(y − µ)2
2σ2
]
. (21)
We asserted earlier that knowing the measure m(y) is part of knowing what
data has been collected. In many physical situations where the data happen to
be distributed according to eq.(21) the underlying space Y is invariant under
translations and we can assume m(y) = m = constant. Indeed, the Gaussian
distribution can be obtained by maximizing an entropy with an underlying
constant measure and constraints on the relevant information the mean µ and
the variance σ2.
From eqs.(5) and (21) the entropy of the likelihood is
S(µ, σ) = log
[
σ
σ0
]
where σ0
def
=
( e
2π
)1/2 1
m
, (22)
and the corresponding Fisher-Rao measure, from eq.(2) is
g(µ, σ) = det
∣∣∣∣ 1/σ2 00 2/σ2
∣∣∣∣ = 2σ4 . (23)
Note that both S(µ, σ) and g(µ, σ) are independent of µ. This means that
if we were concerned with the simpler problem of estimating µ in a situation
where σ happens to be known, the Bayesian estimate of µ using entropic priors
coincides with the maximum likelihood estimate.
When σ is unknown the α-dependent entropic prior, eq.(11), is
π(µ, σ|α) =
21/2
ζ(α)
σα−2
σα0
. (24)
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Since π(µ, σ|α) is improper in both µ and σ we must introduce high and low
cutoffs for both µ and σ. The fact that without cutoffs the model is not well
defined is interpreted as a request for additional relevant information, namely,
the values of the cutoffs.
We write the range of µ as ∆µ = µH − µL and introduce dimensionless
quantities εL and εH ; σ extends from σL = σ0εL to σH = σ0/εH . Then ζ(α)
and π(µ, σ|α) are given by
ζ(α) =
21/2∆µ
σ0
ε1−αH − ε
α−1
L
α− 1
. (25)
and
π(µ, σ|α) =
1
∆µσ0
α− 1
ε1−αH − ε
α−1
L
(
σ
σ0
)α−2
. (26)
Note that π(µ, σ|α = 1) reduces to dσ/σ which is the Jeffreys prior usually
introduced by imposing invariance under scale transformations, σ → λσ.
Writing ε
def
= (εLεH)
1/2, the prior for α, is obtained from eq.(18),
γ(α) =
1
(α− 1)2
−
(
2 log ε
ε1−α − εα−1
)2
(27)
and from eqs.(15) and (19),
π(α) =
γ1/2(α)
z
ε1−α − εα−1
α− 1
exp
[
1
α− 1
+ α
ε1−α + εα−1
ε1−α − εα−1
log ε
]
, (28)
where the normalization z has been suitably redefined.
Eqs.(27) and (28) simplify in the limit ε → 0. Note that the same result is
obtained irrespective of the order in which we let εH → 0 and/or εL → 0. The
resulting γ(α) and π(α) are
γ(α) =
1
(α− 1)2
, (29)
and
π(α) =
{
1
(1−α)2
exp
[
1
α−1
]
for α < 1
0 for α ≥ 1
(30)
where π(α) is normalized and is shown in Fig. 1.
π(α) reaches its maximum value at α = 1/2. Since π(α) ∼ α−2 for α→ −∞
the expected value of α and all higher moments diverge. This suggests that
replacing the unknown α in the prior π(θ|α) by any given numerical value αˆ is
probably not a good approximation.
Since α is unknown the effective prior for θ = (µ, σ) is obtained marginalizing
π(µ, σ, α) = π(µ, σ|α)π(α) over α, eq.(15). Since π(α) = 0 for α ≥ 1 as ε → 0
we can safely take the limit εH → 0 or σH →∞ while keeping σL fixed,
π(µ, σ, α) =
{
1
∆µσL
exp[ 1α−1 ]
1−α
(
σ
σL
)α−2
for α < 1
0 for α ≥ 1.
(31)
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Figure 1: The prior π(α) for various values of the cutoff parameter ε, as ε→ 0.
(However we cannot take σL → 0). The averaged prior for µ and σ is
π¯(µ, σ) =
(σL/σ)
2
∆µσL
∫ 1
−∞
exp
[
1
α−1
]
1− α
(
σ
σL
)α
dα =
2
∆µσ
K0
(
2
√
log
σ
σL
)
, (32)
where K0 is a modified Bessel function of the second kind. This is the entropic
prior for the Gaussian model. The function
P (x) =
2
x
K0
(
2
√
log x
)
(33)
is shown in Fig. 2 as a function of x = σ/σL. The singularity as x → 1 is
integrable.
5 Final remarks
Using the method of maximum relative entropy we have translated the infor-
mation contained in the known form of the likelihood into a prior distribution.
The argument follows closely the analogous application of the ME method to
statistical mechanics. For experiments that cannot be repeated the resulting
“entropic prior” is formally identical with the Einstein fluctuation formula. For
repeatable experiments, however, additional relevant information – represented
in terms of a Lagrange multiplier α – must be included in the analysis. The
important case of a Gaussian likelihood was treated in detail.
We have dealt with the simplest case where all we know about the quantities
θ is that they appear as parameters in the likelihood p(y|θ). Our argument
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Figure 2: The effective π¯(µ, σ) is shown as P (x) = 2xK0
(
2
√
log(x)
)
where
x = σ/σL.
can, however, be generalized to situations where we know of additional relevant
information beyond what is contained in the likelihood. Such information can
be taken into account through additional constraints in the maximization of the
entropy σ.
To conclude we comment briefly on the entropic priors proposed by Skilling
and by Rodr´ıguez. Skilling’s prior, unlike ours, is not restricted to probabil-
ity distributions but is intended for generic “positive additive distributions”
[5]. Our argument, which consists in maximizing the entropy σ subject to a
constraint p(y, θ) = π(θ)p(y|θ), makes no sense for generic positive additive
distributions for which there is no available product rule. Another important
difference arises from the fact that Skilling’s entropy is not, in general, dimen-
sionless and his hyper-parameter α is interpreted some sort of cutoff carrying
the appropriate corrective units. Difficulties with Skilling’s prior were identified
in [12].
Rodr´ıguez’s approach is, like ours, derived from a maximum entropy princi-
ple [9]. One (minor) difference is his treatment of the underlying measure m(y).
For us knowing m(y) is part of knowing what data has been collected; for him
m(y) is an initial guess and he suggests setting m(y) = p(y|θ0) for some value
θ0. The more important difference, however, is that the number of observed
data N is left unspecified. The space Θ × Y N over which distributions are
defined, and therefore the distributions themselves, also remain unspecified. It
is not clear what the maximization of an entropy over such unspecified spaces
could possibly mean but a hyper-parameter α is eventually introduced and it
is interpreted as a “virtual number of observations supporting the initial guess
9
θ0.” A different interpretation is given in [13]. Since α is treated on the same
footing as the other parameters θ,- Rodr´ıguez’s approach requires an endless
chain of hyper-parameters.
Acknowledgments- Many of our comments and arguments have been inspired
by Carlos C. Rodr´ıguez, Volker Dose, and Rainer Fischer through insightful
questions and discussions which we gratefully acknowledge. A. C. also acknowl-
edges the hospitality of the Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Plasmaphysik during the
two extended visits when most of this work was carried out.
References
[1] For a recent review see V. Dose, “Bayesian inference in physics: case stud-
ies”, Rep. Prog. Phys. 66, 1421 (2003); for a pedagogical introduction see
D. S. Sivia, “Data Analysis, A Bayesian Tutorial” (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1996).
[2] A. Caticha, “Relative Entropy and Inductive Inference,” in these proceed-
ings.
[3] For a review with annotated bibliography see e.g., R. E. Kass and L.
Wasserman, J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 91, 1343 (1996).
[4] E. T. Jaynes, IEEE Trans. Syst. Sci. Cybern. Vol. SSC-4, 227 (1968); J.
M. Bernardo, J. Roy. Stat. Soc. B 41, 113 (1979); A. Zellner, “Bayesian
methods and entropy in economics and econometrics” in Maximum En-
tropy and Bayesian Methods, edited by W. T. Grandy Jr. and L. H. Schick
(Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991).
[5] J. Skilling, “Classic Maximum Entropy” in Maximum Entropy and
Bayesian Methods, J. Skilling (ed.) (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1989); “Quanti-
fied Maximum Entropy” in Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods, P.
F. Fouge`re (ed.) (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990).
[6] C. C. Rodr´ıguez, “The metrics generated by the Kullback number” inMax-
imum Entropy and Bayesian Methods, J. Skilling (ed.) (Kluwer, Dordrecht,
1989); “Objective Bayesianism and geometry” in Maximum Entropy and
Bayesian Methods, P. F. Fouge`re (ed.) (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990); “En-
tropic priors” in Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods, edited by W.
T. Grandy Jr. and L. H. Schick (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991); “Bayesian ro-
bustness: a new look from geometry” in Maximum Entropy and Bayesian
Methods, G. R. Heidbreder (ed.) (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1996).
[7] For a more extensive discussion see A. Caticha and R. Preuss, “Maxi-
mum Entropy and Bayesian Data Analysis: Entropic Priors” (online at
arXiv.org/abs/physics/0307055).
10
[8] C. C. Rodr´ıguez, see section 3 of “Are we cruising a hypothesis space?” in
Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods, ed. by W. von der Linden, V.
Dose, R. Fischer and R. Preuss (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1999).
[9] C. C. Rodr´ıguez: ‘Entropic Priors for Discrete Probabilistic Networks and
for Mixtures of Gaussian Models’. In: Bayesian Inference and Maximum
Entropy Methods in Science and Engineering, ed. by R. L. Fry, AIP Conf.
Proc. 617, 410 (2002) (online at arXiv.org/abs/physics/0201016).
[10] A. Caticha, ‘Maximum entropy, fluctuations and priors’, in Bayesian
Methods and Maximum Entropy in Science and Engineering, ed. by
A. Mohammad-Djafari, AIP Conf. Proc. 568, 94 (2001) (online at
arXiv.org/abs/math-ph/0008017).
[11] S. Amari, Differential-Geometrical Methods in Statistics (Springer-Verlag,
1985); for a brief derivation see A. Caticha, “Change, Time and Information
Geometry,” in Bayesian Methods and Maximum Entropy in Science and
Engineering, ed. by A. Mohammad-Djafari, AIP Conf. Proc. 568, 72 (2001)
(online at arXiv.org/abs/math-ph/0008018).
[12] J. Skilling and S. Sibisi, “Priors on Measures” in Maximum-Entropy and
Bayesian Methods, K. M. Hanson and R. N. Silver (eds.) (Kluwer, Dor-
drecht, 1996); J. Skilling, “Massive Inference and Maximum Entropy” in
Maximum-Entropy and Bayesian Methods, G. J. Erickson, J. T. Ryckert
and C. R. Smith (eds.) (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1998).
[13] C. C. Rodr´ıguez: ‘A Geometric Theory of Ignorance,’ in these proceedings.
11
